Relational Quantum Mechanics is about Facts, not States: A reply to Pienaar and Brukner by Di Biagio, Andrea & Rovelli, Carlo
Relational Quantum Mechanics is about Facts, not States:
A reply to Pienaar and Brukner
Andrea Di Biagio1, ∗ and Carlo Rovelli2, 3, 4
1Dipartimento di Fisica, Sapienza Università di Roma, I-00185 Roma, Italy
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In recent works, Časlav Brukner and Jacques Pienaar have raised interesting objections to the
relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. We answer these objections in detail and show
that, far from questioning the viability of the interpretation, they sharpen and clarify it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent papers, one by Jacques Pienaar [1] and
one by Časlav Brukner [2], present insightful observations
and objections on the Relational interpretation of Quan-
tum Mechanics (RQM, also known as relational quantum
mechanics) [3–6]. Here we discuss these papers in de-
tail. We point out that the observations in them are not
challenges against RQM: they are arguments that clarify
and sharpen some aspects of this interpretation. Since
Pienaar’s paper is more detailed, we mainly address it,
mentioning Brukner’s paper where relevant.
Pienaar separates his objections to the relational inter-
pretation into two parts. The first regards the analogy
between RQM and special relativity; the second regards
the status of objectivity in RQM. In the first part, Pien-
aar points out that the analogy with special relativity is
only partial: the sense in which variables are “relative”
in special relativity is more restricted than the sense in
which variables are “relative” in RQM. In the second
part, he argues that RQM cannot be reduced to the rela-
tivity of variables, because facts themselves are relative,
and there is no absolute way of comparing the perspec-
tives of two systems.
Both observations are correct. But they are not objec-
tions to RQM. They are considerations that emphasise
the radicality of the RQM perspective. RQM does not
pretend to make quantum theory less revolutionary than
what it is. It only claims that there exists a coherent
and complete way of thinking about quantum phenom-
ena that makes sense without requiring many worlds, hid-
den variables, cognitive agents, or a macroscopic classical
world. Hence the two objections by Pienaar are only ob-
jections to the hope to spoil RQM of its core (radical)
idea.
Pienaar makes his objections concrete in the form of
five “no-go theorems” which are supposed to pitch the
claims of RQM against one another. To do so, he sum-
marises RQM in terms of six “claims”, that he names
RQM:1–RQM:6. This is a detailed and mostly accu-
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rate account of RQM. But it contains one misstep: a mis-
representation of the claims RQM:5 and RQM:6 (see
below). This misrepresentation is common to both [2]
and [1], and regards the meaning of the quantum state.
In RQM, the quantum state is not a representation of
reality: it is always a relative state and is only a mathe-
matical tool used to predict probabilities of events rela-
tive to a given system. The quantum state of a composite
system relative to an external system is not an account
or record of relative events between the subsystems of the
composite system. It is only a mathematical tool useful
for predicting probabilities of events relative to the ex-
ternal system. Assuming that the quantum state is more
than this is the misunderstanding leading to the apparent
contradictions.
This same mischaracterisation of RQM undermines
Brukner’s critique in [2]. Brukner’s theorem then does
not appear as a critique of RQM. It becomes instead a
restriction on the concept of knowledge—concept that
plays no fundamental role in the formulation of RQM.
Because of the mischaracterisation of RQM:5 and
RQM:6, and the consequent over-emphasis on the quan-
tum state, the theorems, as we shall see, either fall apart
or become evidence of the consistency of the interpreta-
tion. Pienaar’s and Brukner’s acute arguments actually
turn out to illuminate and emphasise the consistency of
the interpretation, rather than challenging it.
In section II, we comment on Pienaar’s formulation
RQM’s claims, pointing out where it is imprecise. We
also briefly anticipate how each of the five no-go theorems
is resolved in a proper understanding of RQM. In section
III, we comment on the relativistic analogy and, in sec-
tion IV, we address Pienaar’s comments about objectiv-
ity in RQM. In this context, we present also a general
philosophical consideration regarding the physical mean-
ing of a subject’s knowledge. In section V, we respond
to Brukner’s paper.
As in Pienaar’s article, we consider three interacting
systems W, F and S, and describe the events relative
to either F or W. The notation is meant to suggest the
setup of Wigner’s friend thought experiment [7].
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II. CLAIMS AND THEOREMS
Pienaar summarizes the RQM literature in terms of six
claims, reported in full for reference:
RQM:1 Any system can be an observer. Any phys-
ical system can play the role of an observer in a
physical interaction.
RQM:2 No hidden variables. Any variable that exists
in the observer’s causal past and which is relevant
to predictions about future quantum events relative
to the observer must be a quantum event contained
in their perspective.
RQM:3 Relations are intrinsic. The relation between
any two systems A and B is independent of any-
thing that happens outside these systems’ perspec-
tives. In particular, the state of B relative to A
depends only upon A’s observation of B and A’s
past history of interactions (similarly for the state
of A relative to B).
RQM:4 Comparisons are relative to one observer.
It is meaningless to compare the accounts of any
two observers except by invoking a third observer
relative to which the comparison is made.
RQM:5 Any physical correlation is a measure-
ment. Suppose an observer measures a pair of sys-
tems and thereby assigns them a joint state which
exhibits perfect correlations between some physi-
cal variables. Then the two systems have mea-
sured each other (entered into a measurement in-
teraction) relative to the observer, and the physical
variables play the roles of the ‘pointer variable’ and
‘measured variable’ of the systems.
RQM:6 Shared facts. In the Wigner’s friend scenario,
ifW measures F to ‘check the reading’ of a pointer
variable (i.e. by measuring F in the appropriate
‘pointer basis’), the value he finds is necessarily
equal to the value that F recorded in her account
of her earlier measurement of S.
This is a good summary of RQM, but some points are
slightly misleading, and one is strongly misleading. Let
us comment on each claim.
RQM:1 Any system can be an observer is essen-
tially correct but poorly phrased, because of the term
“observer”. RQM distinguishes relative facts from stable
facts [6]. Relative facts (or “events”) form the basis of
the ontology; they are ubiquitous and do not require any
special property of the physical systems involved in order
to happen. Stable facts are facts stabilised by decoher-
ence, in the sense that their relativity can be ignored by
a large class of systems [6]. It is better to reserve the
use of operational expressions such as “observer” and
“measurement” to those specific situations where there
is enough decoherence to underpin stability, for instance,
when there is a scientist making observations, or a macro-
scopic system storing memory.1 Terminology aside, the
actual content of RQM:1 is that we assume something
can happen relative to any system—not only measuring
apparata or “observers” that are special in any sense.
So we would rephrase this claim as:
RQM:1? Events, or facts, can happen relative to
any physical system. Events happen in inter-
actions between any two systems and can be de-
scribed as the actualisation of the value of a vari-
able of one system relative to the other.
RQM:2 No hidden variables is a statement about
the universality of QM. It is correct, but RQM is con-
sistent with the time-reversal invariance of fundamental
physics (see [8]), and thus the formulation given by Pien-
aar must be generalised: it remains valid when swapping
‘past’ and ‘future’. RQM:3 Relations are intrinsic
also does not require any modification.
RQM:4 Comparisons are relative to one ob-
server is another key tenet of RQM. The idea is that
contradictions arise when trying to equate descriptions
of physics in two different contexts, namely relative to
different systems. This is for instance what happens in
the Frauchiger and Renner experiment [9]. See [6] for an
analysis of this situation. We rephrase this claim in a
cleaner language as:
RQM:4? Comparisons are only relative to a sys-
tem. It is meaningless to compare events relative
to different systems, unless this is done relative to
a (possibly third) system.
The point is that comparisons can only be made by
a (quantum-mechanical) interaction. In the Wigner’s
friend setup,W might compare the result of his measure-
ment on S with that of F only by physically interacting
with F in an appropriate manner. There is no meaning
in comparing facts relative to W’s with facts relative to
F ’s, (or relative to Schrödinger and his cat) apart from
this direct physical interaction.
We now come to the troublesome points. RQM:5
Any physical correlation is a measurement is the
main problem with Pienaar’s account. In RQM, facts
determine states, not the other way around. Knowing
the state of a system S is not sufficient to deduce the set
of facts relative to the subsystems of S. This is in fact
precisely what Pienaar’s theorems 3 and 5 show.
The problem here is what determines what. Pienaar
and Brukner take the state as primitive and assume that
out of the state one can deduce which events happen in
a composite system. This is not RQM. In RQM, it is
1 To be sure, the RQM literature does use the operational termi-
nology ambiguously and it is indeed common to call “observer”
any system with respect to which a variable takes values. We
shall also indulge in this abuse of language below.
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the other way around. Events are primitive. Their hap-
pening is partially reflected in the state of the composite
system relative to a third system. But only partially.
Events cannot be read out of the state.
The existence of a correlation between two variables
gives indications about events, but in general it is not
sufficient to tell which event was or was not realised. To
know what event lead to the creation of a correlation, one
needs to know more, for example the dynamics that cou-
pled the two systems and, in particular, what variables
are involved in the interaction.
Besides this key misrepresentation, there is also a
terminological problem in RQM:5, parallel to the one
pointed out for RQM:1. Pienaar calls a “measurement”
what the RQM literature calls an event that establishes
a fact. It is much better to reserve the loaded expression
“measurement” to interactions that stabilise certain facts
and require decoherence.
A proper reformulation of RQM:5, is:
RQM:5? An interaction between two systems re-
sults in a correlation within the interactions
between these two systems and a third one.
With respect to a third system W, the interaction
between the two systems S and F is described by
a unitary evolution that potentially entangles the
quantum states of S and F .
As we shall see, while RQM:5 is in tension with
RQM:3, RQM:5? is not.
RQM:5? goes hand in hand with RQM:1?. These
two assumptions together provide the resolution of the
measurement problem in RQM. Von Neumann measure-
ments are compatible with unitary evolution because
they describes facts relative to two interacting systems
(S and F) while the unitary evolution regards facts rel-
ative to a third system (W).
Finally, RQM:6 Shared facts as stated by Pienaar
is either wrong (if it is intended to override RQM:4) or
a tautology. It is not possible to decide which because
Pienaar does not mention the context of the comparison.
According to RQM:4, the only meaning of a comparison
between an event relative to F and an event relative to
W is in the context of a measurement made by a specified
system.
A non ambiguous claim is:
RQM:6? Shared facts. In the Wigner’s
friend scenario, ifW measures S on the same
basis on which F did, then appropriately in-
teracts with F to ‘check the reading’ of a
pointer variable (i.e. by measuring F in the
appropriate ‘pointer basis’), the two values
found are in agreement.
We briefly anticipate the resolution of the “no-go” the-
orems, discussed in detail in the following sections.
• Theorem 1 does not bite because it relies on Pien-
aar’s version of RQM:5.
• Theorem 2 relies on two assumptions that are not
valid in RQM because they misrepresent the role of
the quantum state in the interpretation.
• Theorem 3 relies on RQM:6 which is incorrect.
• Theorem 4 does not bite because of RQM:5 again.
• Theorem 5 relies on RQM:5, which is incorrect.
Theorems 2, 3, and 5 offer two alternatives (two ‘horns’).
As we shall discuss below, RQM ‘grabs a horn’ in each of
them. Theorem 2 elucidates what RQM is about, while
grabbing the horn in theorems 3 and 5 simply amounts to
correcting Pienaar’s mischaracterisation of RQM. Theo-
rems 1 and 4 do not apply to RQM, for the same impor-
tant reason, they are based on the misunderstanding of
the role of the quantum state.
III. THE ANALOGY WITH RELATIVITY
The analogy between SR and RQM is often used in
presentations of RQM. Pienaar shows in detail that the
relationalism on which RQM is based is far more radical
that the relationalism that underpins classical relativity.
Therefore the conceptual novelty of quantum theory can-
not be reduced to a simple recognition that all variables
are relative, like velocity is relative in mechanics.
Pienaar’s judgement is spot on. He characterises the
relationality of RQM with the slogan “facts are rela-
tive”. He is right in this. He suggests changing the name
of the interpretation to ‘Relative-facts interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics’. That might be appropriate, but
‘Relational’ also works, because reality relative to one
system—the collections of facts relative to that system—
is composed of direct interactions this system has with
the rest of the world. Rendering facts relative is a gen-
eralisation of relativity, albeit a drastic one.
On the other hand, Pienaar’s claim that “without
the conceptual analogy to classical relativistic relations,
RQM would lose its core motivation as an interpretation”
is a non sequitur. The interest and the value of RQM does
not depend on it being analogous to something else. As
any interpretation of quantum mechanics, it derives its
worth from the extent it elucidates our quantum world.
In addition, there are two other aspects of the anal-
ogy, that Pienaar disregards. First, special relativity is a
conceptual advance based on the realisation that a previ-
ously “obvious” notion—absolute simultaneity—is in fact
inappropriate to describe the world. RQM is a concep-
tual advance based on the realisation that another previ-
ously “obvious” notion—absolute facts—may in fact be
inappropriate to describe the world. (We might soon
have empirical evidence for this, see [10].)
Second, there is a methodological similarity between
RQM and special relativity: the idea of searching for
transparent physical principles from which the mathe-
matical structure of the theory can be defined. The two
principles proposed in the first paper on RQM [3], are
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1. The relevant information that can be extracted
from a finite region of the phase space of a physical
system is finite,
2. It is always possible to extract novel relevant infor-
mation from a physical system.
are based on the idea that the theory describes the rela-
tive information that a system can gather about another
system. These principles serve as the first two axioms of
Höhn’s and Wever’s compelling reconstruction [11–13].
In brief, the analogy with relativity played a historical
role in the development of RQM and has some interest
despite the fact that it is not complete. Perhaps Pienaar
hoped that the radical conceptual novelty of quantum
mechanics could be reduced to nothing else than some
minor extension of special relativity. If the literature on
RQM has given this impression, this is a mistake. RQM
is genuinely radical.
Let us now look at the two theorems with which Pien-
aar supports his claim.
No-go theorem 1
Dilemma: Suppose a system F has mea-
sured S, and this fact is verified by a third
system W who measures F-S. Then there
exist situations in which one of the following
must be true:
(i) F has measured S simultaneously in in-
compatible bases, relative to W;
(ii) The basis in which F has measured S is
indeterminate relative to W.
Pienaar understands this dilemma to be a no-go the-
orem because both alternatives contradict some of the
RQM claims. In particular, (ii) contradicts RQM:5.
The solution of the difficulty is that (ii) is correct and
does not contradict any of the RQM claims, because it
is RQM:5? and not RQM:5 that characterises RQM
and (ii) is not in contradiction with RQM:5?. Under-
lying this, there is a misunderstanding of the role of the
quantum state in RQM.
Let us see this in more detail. In the proof of the
dilemma, a situation is considered in which the state of




αi |xi〉S |Fxi〉F , (1)
where {xi} and {Fxi} denote eigenvalues of some ob-
servables X and FX of S and F respectively. Pienaar
notes that in general this Schmidt decomposition is not





βn |yn〉S |Fyn〉F . (2)
He then uses of RQM:5 (every correlation is a measure-
ment) to derive horn (i) of the dilemma. Since there is a
correlation both between X and FX and between Y and
FY , then, allegedly, F has measured S simultaneously
on the incompatible bases X and Y . This is not the case
in RQM, RQM:5 cannot be applied. All that |Ψ〉SF
tells us is which kinds of correlations exist between the
variables of the two systems, relative to W .
The confusion arises also because of Pienaar’s use of
the word ‘measurement’. Relative to W, the only mean-
ing that can be ascribed to the question of whether or
not F has “measured” S is whether there is a correla-
tion between the relevant variables of the two systems.
Since there is a correlation between different pairs of vari-
ables, in this sense and only in this sense, the “measure-
ment” happened in multiple bases. The strangeness of
the statement is only the inappropriate use of the expres-
sion “measurement” in this situation. As Pienaar himself
notes, the RQM literature often recommends not to use
this misleading expression. If we use proper expressions,
everything returns to reasonable. With respect to W, is
there a correlation between variables of S and variables
of F? Yes there is. In which basis? In more than one
basis.
So how do we know which of S’s variables became def-
inite relative to F? We do not, if we only know the state
|Ψ〉SF . More information can be obtained from the dy-
namics of the system. The state (1) for instance may
arise as a result of an interaction between S and F in
which the evolution of F depends on the value of the
variable X of S. For example, the interaction Hamilto-
nian can depends on this variable. From the perspective
of F , this interaction leads to the actualization of the
variable X of S. But the same state relative to W could
arise via an interaction Hamiltonian that depends on the
variable Y , and then it is this variable that actualizes
relative to F . The physics of the two processes is differ-
ent, but results in the same state relative to W, namely
in the same probability distribution of events relative to
W. The final state relative toW lacks information about
what happens among subsystems.
Pienaar refers to the observable M of the combined
system S − F that was introduced in [14]. This is an
observable that W can measure to check the existence of
a perfect correlation between certain variables:
M |xi〉S |Fxj〉F = δij |xi〉S |Fxi〉F . (3)
The same M can be expressed as
M |yn〉S |Fym〉F = δnm |xn〉S |Fxm〉F . (4)
Measuring M = 1 tells us that the correlation exists and
is maximal. This is compatible with either X or Y hav-
ing taken a definite value relative to F . The value of M
on its own, does not allow W to know which variable is
definite relative to F .
The central idea of RQM is that, since the only way
for W and F to communicate is via a quantum mechani-
cal measurement, there is no meaning to any other form
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of relations between the two. Here Pienaar is equating
two distinct statements: (i) a variable of S has a value
with respect to F , and (ii) with respect to W, there is a
correlation to be expected between a variable of S and
a pointer variable of F . The first implies the second,
but the second does not imply the first. The second can
regard multiple bases even while the first cannot.
No-go theorem 2
This theorem is meant to express a contradiction be-
tween a set of three assumptions (i)-(iii) constraining the
set of possible states that two systems F and W might
assign to a third system S and the fact (iv) that not
all state assignments are good states assignments. We
report here the two relevant assumptions:
(ii) Any valid state assignment |ψ〉S by F can
always be verified by W. That is, there must
exists a ‘pointer basis’ of F such that, if W
were to measure in this basis and condition on
the outcome, there would be a nonzero prob-
ability of updating the state of S relative to
W to |ψ〉S .
(iii) Conversely, any assignment |ψ〉S by F
which can be verified by W (in the above
sense) must be a valid possible assignment
for F .
The theorem is again expressed as a dilemma:
Dilemma: The set of assumptions (i)-(iii)
are together incompatible with (iv). Specifi-
cally, given thatW assigns an entangled state
[|Ψ〉SF ] of the form [(1)], and assuming the
coefficients αi are all nonzero, then every
pure state in the Hilbert space of S is a pos-
sible state relative to F .
RQM resolves this no-go theorem by rejecting assump-
tions (ii) and (iii).
Again, the point is the role of the quantum state in
RQM. The state does not represent a description of real-
ity; it is a computational tool to compute the likelihood
of events. Say W assigns state (1) to S − F and then
measures FX and finds the value Fx. Then W will have
to update the quantum state of S−F to |x〉S |Fx〉F . But
in no way is W allowed to conclude that F had assigned
the state |x〉S to S. ForW to conclude that the new state
of S relative to them is the state that S had assigned, W
would need to know that the variable X had become a
fact relative to F .
Let us be even more explicit, and consider the original
Wigner’s friend thought experiment, where F is an actual
human in a lab and the operational talk of the previous
paragraphs can be understood literally. Wigner knows
that Friend measures a qubit on the computational basis,
and that the value of Z is then a fact relative to Friend.
Wigner assigns a state proportional to
|0〉S |F0〉F + |1〉S |F1〉F (5)
to the combined system. If Wigner then measures the
Friend on the FZ basis and obtains F0, he is allowed to
conclude that F had assigned the state |0〉 to S. What
happens instead if Wigner decides instead to measure
Friend on the complementary basis {|F±〉 ∝ |F0〉±|F1〉}
and obtains F+? Despite his experimental genius, he
would be a fool to entertain that Friend had assigned
the state |+〉 to S! Wigner’s choice of measuring on this
complementary basis meant he had to forsake the ability
to reveal Friend’s assignment.
How radical is radical?
One point in Pienaar’s rhetoric is to emphasize the rad-
ical relationalism of quantum phenomenology contrast-
ing it with the consistency of the classical world. For
instance, Pienaar writes:
when two observers are in a situation where
they disagree about the state of a system in
RQM, the state relative to one observer places
no non-trivial constraints on the state rela-
tive to the other observer, in stark contradis-
tinction to disagreements about velocity and
other classical quantities in relativity.
The misleading aspect of this rhetoric is that it ignores
the physical source of the classical consistency. Classical
consistency is not incompatible with quantum physics.
On the contrary, its origin is clarified: it is the result of
constant interactions and decoherence. Because of deco-
herence, the world experienced by humans is extremely
stable and because of the frequent interactions, stable
facts ascertained by different observers are in agreement.
Hence, in practice, facts relative to one observer do place
strict constraints on stable facts relative to another. This
is why human creatures agree on the quantum state to
assign to a system, on non-relational properties they as-
sign to systems, and on the existence of a shared reality.
RQM does not bring any subversion to the stability and
coherence of this classical, macroscopic world. Instead,
it shows that, by recognizing the ultimately relative na-
ture of events, we can have a coherent understanding of
nature beyond the macroscopic regime in which the ap-
proximation that facts are perfectly stable is assumed to
hold.
Another rhetorical move by Pienaar is to compare the
RQM terminology with analogous terminology in differ-
ent contexts. For instance, Pienaar writes
Far from having de-mystified quantum me-
chanics by appealing to relations, RQM has
merely mystified the concept of a ‘relation’.
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RQM takes the notions of physical system and quantum
events happening between systems as primary. Quan-
tum events involve two systems, are discrete, and are
described by one variable of one system taking a value
relative to the other system. The world is not described
by the individual properties of individual systems, but
by relative properties. These are called ‘relations’ be-
cause they involve more than one system. There is noth-
ing mystifying in this terminology. ‘Relations’ have to
be intended within this conceptual scheme, not in the
conceptual scheme of classical mechanics, where they are
subsidiaries of properties of individual systems. If Pien-
aar hoped that quantum theory could be understood by
retaining the classical conceptual scheme and just focus-
ing on relations within that scheme, he is comprehensibly
disappointed, and comprehensibly finds the RQM notion
of ‘relation’ mystified.
All things considered, the main objection that Pienaar
raises to RQM is not that it is inconsistent: it is that of
being more radical than what he hoped for.
IV. ON OBJECTIVITY
This part of Pienaar’s objections have to do with the
consequences of RQM:4 have on notions of objectiv-
ity and the extent to which different perspective can be
shown to agree.
No-go theorem 3
Dilemma: RQM cannot consistently main-
tain both the principle of RQM:6: shared
facts, and the principle of RQM:4: com-
parisons are relative to one observer.
Rejecting one or the other leads to the fol-
lowing two horns:
(i) If RQM rejects RQM:6, then it either im-
plies solipsism, or else an ontology of island
universes (these terms will be defined at the
end of this section).
(ii) If RQM instead rejects RQM:4, it be-
comes vulnerable to our next no-go theorem,
in Sec. IV B.
As anticipated in section II, Pienaar’s formulation of
RQM:6, is loose enough that it is either wrong, or a
tautology. The proof of this no-go theorem illustrates
this point.
Pienaar tries to derive the contradiction in the follow-
ing way. Consider our two systems F and W interacting
with S. The quantum state of S relative to W or F will
depend on the interactions between these three systems.
He proceeds:
Now suppose we have before us a description
of W’s account, and a description of F ’s ac-
count – laid out ‘side by side’ in a view from
nowhere, so to speak – and we would like
to know: are these accounts mutually consis-
tent?
Pienaar correctly points out that
according to RQM:4, this is not a well-
posed question, because there is no ‘view from
nowhere’
and yet he also holds that
RQM:6 requires that this question be well-
posed, for otherwise there would be no way
to assert that two observer’s accounts are in
agreement.
If Pienaar intended RQM:6 to imply that there is a ‘view
from nowhere,’ from which to compare all accounts of
reality, then clearly one must reject RQM:6, as it con-
tradicts RQM:4.
Crucially, however, there is a way to “assert that two
observer’s accounts are in agreement” (despite having re-
jected RQM:6): have F write down her account and let
W read it and compare it with its own.2 That W will
find that F ’s account is in agreement with his, is precisely
the content of RQM:6?, which is clearly compatible with
RQM:4.
Rejecting Pienaar’s RQM:6 and replacing it with
RQM:6? amounts to grabbing horn (i) of the dilemma.
Pienaar claims that this would plunge us into solipsism
or into an ontology of island universes. Would it?
Solipsism?
The claim that RQM leads to “solipsism” has appeared
elsewhere, especially in popular science (see for instance
[15]).
In the philosophical literature and in common par-
lance, solipsism has nothing to with incomplete of com-
munication between physical systems. It is instead the
idea that there is a single subject that exhausts all of
reality and that the rest of reality only exists as the ex-
perience of that single subject.
This is exactly the opposite of RQM. The main as-
sumption of RQM, its defining assumption, in fact, is the
antithesis of solipsism: the world is not what is perceived
by a single special entity—it is a network of interactions
between equal status entities.
Pienaar does eventually concede3 that probably RQM
does not propose solipsism. He correctly characterises
2 Or, in less anthropomorphised terms: let the dynamics be such
that F encodes its account of S in a suitable pointer variable
and let W interact with that variable.
3 In fact, it is puzzling that he chooses to levy such a charge in
the first place. He recently wrote an excellent comparison [16]
between RQM and QBism, another interpretation often accused
of being solipsistic. Neither interpretation is solipsist, for the
same reason.
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RQM’s view: there are facts relative to every system,
but that the different perspectives on reality, namely, the
ensemble of facts relative to a single system, cannot be
compared in an absolute manner; they can only be com-
pared via a physical interaction. This is correct.
He calls this an ontology of “island universes.” Fine,
if he likes this name. We do not, let us explain why.
Embodied knowledge
There is a subtle but important philosophical issue in-
volved here. Consider on the case in which the systems
F and W are actually “observers” in the rich sense of
the term. Say they are humans with laboratories, note-
books and books that store and process knowledge about
the world. Let us focus on F . What is the meaning of
the statement that F has knowledge about the world, for
instance about S?
There are two possible answers. The first is a nat-
uralistic answer. The second is a dualistic or idealistic
answer. According to the first, this is a statement about
the actual physical configuration of the ink and the note-
books, the charges in the computers and the synapses in
the brain in F and about the correlation of these with
whatever can be observed in S. According to the second,
F ’s knowledge is something over and above its physical
configuration. In this case, the “inaccessibility” of F ’s
knowledge, namely of the “universe as seen by F” is in-
deed there. But this only follows because one assumes
that knowledge is unphysical.
We adhere to a naturalistic philosophy. In a natural-
istic philosophy, what F “knows” regards physical vari-
ables in F . And this is accessible to W. If knowledge
is physical, it is accessible by other systems via physical
interactions. It is precisely for this reason that knowl-
edge is also subjected to the constraints and the physical
accidents due to quantum theory. A physical interac-
tion can and does destroy knowledge, because of standard
Heisenberg uncertainty. Hence, ultimately, the intuition
that disturbs Pienaar is a residual of anti-naturalism: the
idea that knowledge can remain immune from quantum
phenomena, because it can be disembodied.
Are relative facts needed?
Clarified this (subtle) point, there remains4 in Pien-
aar’s [1] an objection:
this proliferation of disjoint universes is not
motivated by observations, nor does it serve
any explanatory purpose.
4 Brukner reported a similar concern in an email [17].
Every interpretation of quantum theory is “motivated
by observations” in the sense that it is an attempt to
devise a conceptual scheme that makes sense of a vast
number of observations. More precisely, to make sense
of the fact that observations are well described by quan-
tum theory. As such, it is deeply rooted in observations:
without observations, quantum theory—and its tentative
interpretations—would never have appeared.
More to the point, what is the explanatory purpose of
the multiplication of perspectives in RQM? The answer
is that it offers a possible explanation to the key mys-
tery of quantum physics: the apparent special role that
“observers” seem to have in the theory.
RQM illuminates this mystery by denying that there
is anything special in observers, in the following general
sense: facts happen relative to any system (RQM:1).
What is special in a (large class) of macroscopic observers
is only that decoherence and frequent interactions sta-
bilise and render consistent for them many relative facts.
RQM is the observation that quantum physics can be
made sense of also beyond the limit of perfect decoher-
ence.
Thus, the “explanatory purpose” of RQM’s multipli-
cation of perspectives (the idea that facts happen at in-
teractions between any two systems) is that it serves as
a possible solution to the measurement problem. It helps
to answer questions like:
• Q: When does something become a fact?
A: Something becomes a fact, relative to you, when
you interact with a system.
• Q: How does Schrödinger’s cat feel?
A: Either awake looking at the vial, or asleep hav-
ing a dream. The cat does not stop having expe-
riences only because the box is sealed off from the
rest of the lab.
• Q: What physical systems are measuring apparata?
A: Any system whose pointer variables (i) get ap-
propriately entangled to a variable you are inter-
ested and (ii) with which you can interact.
• Q: When does the wavefunction collapse?
A: The wavefunction for S relative to W collapses
whenever W interacts with—gets a kick from—S
and therefore W gathers information about S.
Island universes
The expression “island universes” that Pienaar uses
to RQM’s discredit is taken from Huxley’s The Doors of
Perception [18], where “island universes” is applied to
conscious experiences. The situation with conscious ex-
periences is in fact analogous to that in quantum physics,
but instead of weakening the motivation for postulating
multiple perspectives, it strengthens it.
Do I have direct evidence that other humans have a
first-person experience of reality like mine? I do not. Is
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thinking that other humans have experiences like mine
a hypothesis that is “not motivated by observations, nor
[serves] any explanatory purpose”? Of course not! The
alternative is to think that I myself am the only conscious
being in the universe, namely solipsism!
We have ample reasons to believe that we share con-
scious experiences with (at least) other humans. By the
same token, RQM points out that we have reasons to be-
lieve that we share the reality of perspectival facts with
any physical system.
This is the core of RQM: I understand that I am a
normal physical system and, as such, I am affected by
the rest of reality. Hence I make a reasonable extrapola-
tion, based on this and on my realisation that I am not
special. I have no reason to believe that reality comes
into being only when it interacts with me, and not also
when anything interacts with anything else. That there
is no fundamentally distinguished class of systems called
“the classical world” or “measuring apparata” that have
the privileged ability of actualising the variables of other
systems.
Finally, Pienaar complains that the different “views”
do not “share facts”. Here, Pienaar puts undue restric-
tions on what is a shared fact.
The analogy with conscious experience helps us here,
too. Can two people “share” the same experience? It
depends what we mean by that. If we mean to ask if
two people can have the exact same set of sensory ex-
periences at the same time and think the exact same
thoughts, then clearly no. But this is not how we nor-
mally understand the phrase. We share experiences when
we listen to the same performance of an orchestra, when
we watch a movie together, when we analyse the same
object together. And we can verify that we are sharing
experiences by comparing our mental lives—not in some
sort of absolute external sense, but by interacting with
(talking and listening to) each other. The two internal
mental lives are still different after talking, but the two
people can nevertheless reach an intersubjective agree-
ment.
In the ontology of RQM, two systems F andW cannot
share the same facts about a third system S in the sense
that whenever there is a quantum event for F , there is
also immediately a quantum event for W. It is not even
the case that a later interaction between W and F can
make a previous quantum event between S and F a quan-
tum event for W. What they can do, however, is verify
that there is a consistency between their shared perspec-
tive, by interacting with (or measuring, as Pienaar puts
it) each other. In this sense, F and W end up sharing
facts: the behaviour of F and S that W observes is co-
herent with the assumption that F sees the same S as
W does.
The fear that this destroys the coherence of the world
or throws us into a solipsistic nightmare is similar to the
fear that by setting the Earth in motion Copernicus chal-
lenged the stability of the houses built on Earth.
Yet, quantum physics teaches us that W could also
interact with F in a way that destroys F account of their
previous interaction with S. Is this surprising? Perhaps,
but this is what quantum physics implies.
The loose frame loophole
Pienaar also raises a concern regarding the ambiguous
way in which some RQM literature talks about facts rel-
ative to different systems. This is a valid concern. It has
already been echoed out by at least one other source [19].
This ambiguity is a defect of the original literature.
Statements such as “when two systems F andW inter-
act with a system S, the perspectives of W and F agree,
and this can be checked in a physical interaction”, which
can be found in the RQM literature, mean only that W
can interact with F ’s pointers and check that they were
affected in its interactions with S in a way consistent with
what W directly learns about S. This is the content of
RQM:6? again. Obviously, F can do the same with W
(RQM:1).
This is normally left implicit whenever one talks about
facts relative to different observers, assuming that it is
clear enough to fill in the gaps. This is sometimes easier
and sometimes harder. Indeed, Pienaar brings up [6]
as an example in which things are more complex than
even the authors of the original paper realised. Let us
look at this example in detail and make sure that the
loophole is closed, as this can serve as an example for
other situations.
The central point of [6] is the definition of a stable
fact. A fact relative to F is said to be stable for W if
classical probability calculus can be used to compute the
probability of an event forW using this fact relative to F .
More specifically, assume that, from W’s perspective, F
interacts with a variable A of S; According to RQM:1?
and RQM:4?, this interaction may result in the value of
A to become a fact relative to F , but no fact is established
relative to W. However, the value of A relative to F is
considered stable for W if, in computing the probability
for a variable B to taking the value b relative to W in a




P (b|ai)P (a(F)i ). (6)
In the formula above, we have inserted superscripts to
highlight that stability allows to mix perspectives. At
an operational level, it allows to reason as if there is
epistemic uncertainty about the value of A relative to
W, even though, ontologically, A does not have an actual
value relative to W. The conditional probability
P (b|ai) = | 〈b|ai〉 |2 (7)
does not need superscripts: the transition probabilities
are the main outputs of quantum theory and they de-
fine the probability of facts relative to a system, given
other facts relative to the same system. (In [6], we wrote
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P (b(W)|a(F)i ), but, as Pienaar remarks, this notation is
highly misleading; a better notation would have been
P (b(W)|a(W)i ). Better still to omit the superscript, since
the transition probabilities given by the Born rule (7) are
independent of the context W.)
Pienaar expresses his doubts that a formula like (6)
can ever make sense in RQM, as it relates probabili-
ties of facts relative to different systems. Indeed, while
quantum theory allows the computation of the transition
probabilities P (b|ai) as well as the probability P (b(W))
(given the state of S − F relative to W), the quantities
P (a(F)i ) do not have meaning in RQM, a priori. But this
is precisely the point of the definition. The P (a(F)i ) ac-
quire this meaning when the relation between P (b(W))
and P (b|ai) is given by (6). In other words, when the
interaction between S and F (as described byW) is such
that (6) holds for some probability distribution P (a(F)i ),
then P (a(F)i ) acquires the meaning of a probability dis-
tribution over the possible values of A—even though the
value of A is not a fact relative to W. The value of A
might be a fact relative to F , hence the superscript.
The reader is invited to consider the example in sec-
tion 1.2 of [6], also reported in the appendix A.
As Pienaar remarks, the de-labelling is methodological.
Even when (6) holds, there is no ontological identification
of a fact relative to F with a fact relative to W. For all
practical purposes, different systems in the same stability
class act as if they live in a macroreality of absolute facts
and as if they share facts.
No-go theorem 4
This theorem is the second horn of the dilemma that
No-go theorem 3 was supposed to offer. We grabbed the
first horn, so we are not required to answer to this, but
we will do anyway, because is another example of the
mischaracterisation of the role of the quantum state.
The theorem is in a form of a trilemma:
Trilemma: The propositions P1 & P2 and
the claim RQM:3 cannot all be true.
where
P1. W can measure F-S in any basis at
Event 2, independently of which basis F mea-
sured S at Event 1.
and
P2: Suppose W measures F-S in the
{|Fym〉 |yn〉} basis and obtains some out-
come, updating the state relative toW to one
of the states in {|Fyn〉 |yn〉} just after Event
2. Then we can interpret this state as indi-
cating that ‘F measured S in the {|yn〉} basis
and obtained one of the outcomes in the set




αi |xi〉S |Fxi〉F , (8)
The solution is simple: P1 and RQM:3 are true in RQM,
while P2 is false. This is again caused by the wrong
formulation of RQM:5. The fact that S − F is in the
state |yn〉S |Fyn〉F does not imply that the value of Y is
a fact for F . Indeed, one way to prepare such a state is
to start with S and F uncorrelated and just rotate each
system separately into |yn〉S |Fyn〉F . In this case S and
F never interacted and there could not be a fact about
S relative to F . Or, in the operational language, F did
not measure S.
No-go theorem 5
This last no-go theorem again fails because of Pien-
aar’s wrong formulation of RQM:5. The theorem con-
siders particular states of the S − F system and tries
to derive something about facts of S relative to F from
these states. Again, this is not a possible logic in RQM.
The states in question (as Pienaar himself points out) are
states relative to W. What they contain is information
about what W can measure, namely how the S −F sys-
tem has affectedW or can affectW is the future. Trying
to read out from these states the full facts relative to F
is is not something compatible with RQM.
V. QUBITS ARE NOT OBSERVERS
Let us now come to Brukner’s no-go theorem [2]. Like
Pienaar’s results, this is a correct mathematical observa-
tion that instead of providing a criticism of RQM, serves
to sharpen the interpretation. His explicit aim is pre-
sented in the introduction:
I will derive a no-go theorem that restricts the
possibility of understanding the relational de-
scription in RQM as knowledge that one sys-
tem can have about another in the conven-
tional sense of that term.
Part of what makes Brukner’s result seem a challenge
towards RQM, is Brukner’s use of operational language
(such as “measurement,” “observer,” and “knowledge”)
to formulate his no-go theorem even though, as he himself
remarks, “RQM makes not reference to [these] concepts”.
The other aspect that contributes to the confusion is
his overplaying the role of the quantum state. Like in
Pienaar’s no-go theorems 1, 2, 4, and 5, Brukner tries
to read relative facts between two systems by looking at
the state assigned to these by a third system, while RQM
does not allow this.
The setup of the theorem is essentially that of Pien-
aar’s no-go theorem 1. Two systems5 S and O are in
5 We switch from S and F to S and O to be closer to Brukner’s [2].
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some potentially entangled state |ψ〉SO. Note that (i)
here O stands for “observer”, (ii) there is no restriction
on the nature of S and O (they can be qubits), and (iii)
Brukner does not specify what the state |ψ〉SO is relative
to, we take it as relative to a third system W . Then the
theorem states that the two following things cannot both
be true.
1. (DefRS) Definite Relative State For




ci |xi〉S |Xi〉O , (9)
[...] the states |Xi〉O are states of knowledge
of the observer. When the observer is in
state |Xi〉O she knows that the system is in
the definite relative state |xi〉S .
2. (DisRS) Distinct Relative State
The observer’s states of knowledge |X〉O
and |X〉O, which are correlated with distinct
relative states |x〉S and |x′〉S of the system,
are represented by orthogonal vectors in the
observer’s Hilbert space, i.e. if |x〉S 6= |x′〉S ,
then 〈X|X ′〉 = 0.
Since RQM makes no appeal to a notion of knowledge,
it’s not clear why this should be a challenge to RQM.
From RQM’s perspective, Brukner’s result ostensibly is a
no-go theorem about the meanings that the word “knowl-
edge” can assume, given what we know about quantum
mechanics.
Indeed, we see two ways of reading this result, either
• DefRS is taken as a definition of the word “knowl-
edge,” and then DisRS is false, or
• DisRS is a constraint on what can be a “state of
knowledge”, and then DefRS is false.
If we take DefRS to define knowledge, then a O has
knowledge about S in the sense that at that W can learn
about the probabilities of future interaction with S by
interacting with O. This is the same well-defined sense
in which a given set of pixels on my computer screen
have knowledge about the time and a given set of ink
molecules in a book have knowledge about lasers: by
interacting with those molecules I expect to learn about
future interactions with coherent light. In this sense,
“knowledge” is nothing more—and nothing less—than
correlations between two systems, as expected by a third.
Then the failure of DisRS tells us nothing we didn’t
know already: when S and O are entangled, interacting
with different variables of S affects our information about
different variables of O.
Consider now using DisRS as a constraint on what is
a state of knowledge. Then the failure of DefRS implies
that one has to have correlations on a preferred basis be-
fore talking about knowledge. This is closer to the other
meaning of the word “knowledge” as applied to complex
systems such as agents and conscious observers. This is
perhaps “the conventional sense” that Brukner’s has in
mind in the introduction, although it’s still a naturalistic
use of the world, as it refers to the physical properties
of such observer. Then a superposition of two states of
knowledge is not a new state of knowledge, but a super-
position of two states of knowledge.
Both choices are valid. The only problem is confusing
the different possible meanings of the word knowledge.
And that is why the RQM literature warns against using
terms that are normally reserved for macroscopic physics
when talking about the fundamental elements of the the-
ory.
In sum, we agree with Brukner that “qubits are not
observers,” for the uncontroversial fact that qubits are
not decision-making agents capable of processing infor-
mation. That has never been a claim of RQM. The
controversial claim that RQM makes is RQM1? (facts
happen relative to any physical system). Brukner’s
no-go theorem has no impact on this, since a state such
as (9) that W assigns to S and O is not enough for W
to infer what might or might not be a fact for O, as ex-
plained in detail in section III when discussing Pienaar’s
no-go theorem 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pienaar’s [1] presents arguments against two ideas:
that (i) RQM preserves certain classical relativistic in-
tuitions about relations and (ii) it preserves the idea
that consistency can be established between different ob-
servers’ accounts. Both conclusions are correct: (i) RQM
does not preserve certain classical relativistic intuitions
about relations: it extends them and makes them more
radical (“facts are relative”). And, (ii) RQM does not
preserve the idea that consistency can be established be-
tween different observers’ accounts. It replaces it with
the idea that systems communicate in the sense that
they can measure (quantum mechanically!) each other’s
pointer variables. Since I myself am an observer, I find
nothing strange in the idea that you could read pointer
variables in me that gets correlated with external vari-
ables when these are realised with respect to me.
Brukner’s [2] argues that if we want to call the entan-
glement of two systems “knowledge” that the two systems
have about one another, then this “knowledge” differs in
some radical way from common usage.
These objections do not challenge the coherence of
RQM. They maybe show that RQM is more radical than
what it might appear at a first sight.
Does an ontology where views cannot be compared di-
rectly and physical systems can only check each other
via quantum measurements imply solipsism? No, it does
not. Does it change in depth our way of thinking about
reality? Yes it does. Quantum mechanics is radical. One
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Appendix A: How decoherence stabilises facts6
Consider two systems S and E (E for “environment”),
and a variable A of the system S to which E is couple. Let
ai be its eigenvalues. A generic state of the compound





αi |ai〉 ⊗ |ψi〉 , (A1)
where |ψi〉 are normalised states of E . Let us define
ε = max
i 6=j
| 〈ψi|ψj〉 |2. (A2)
Now, suppose that: (a) ε is vanishing or very small and
(b) W does not interact with E . Then the probability
P (b(W)) of any possible fact relative to W resulting from
an interaction between S and W can be computed from
the density matrix obtained tracing over E , that is,








P (b(W)|a(E)i )P (a
(E)
i ) +O(ε). (A4)
Thus, probabilities for facts b relative to W calculated
in terms of the possible values of A satisfy (6), up to a
small deviation of order ε. Hence, by our definition, the
value of the variable A is stable for W—to the extent to
which one ignores effects of order ε. In the limit ε → 0,
the variable A of the system S is exactly stable for W.
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